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| The signing of the Varkiza Agreement, 12 February 1945 |
On this day, February 12, 1945, the negotiations between the representatives of EAM and the Plastiras government were concluded and the unacceptable Varkiza Agreement was signed.
In the negotiations, the EAM delegation consisted of G. Siantos (Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and head of the delegation), M. Partsalidis (Secretary of the CC of EAM) and l. Tsirimokos (General Secretary of the Union of People's Democracy party). The government was represented by I. Sofianopoulos (Minister of Foreign Affairs), P. Rallis (Minister of Interior) and Ioannis Makropoulos (Minister of Agriculture).
In the negotiations, the EAM delegation consisted of G. Siantos (Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and head of the delegation), M. Partsalidis (Secretary of the CC of EAM) and l. Tsirimokos (General Secretary of the Union of People's Democracy party). The government was represented by I. Sofianopoulos (Minister of Foreign Affairs), P. Rallis (Minister of Interior) and Ioannis Makropoulos (Minister of Agriculture).
The Agreement provided for the demobilization and disarmament of ELAS, ELAN and the National Militia. Also, among other things, the purge of the state apparatus from collaborators and fascist elements and the holding of a referendum and subsequent elections in 1945.
The Agreement was preceded by the unfavorable outcome of the battle of Athens and Piraeus during the critical class conflict of December 1944. However, the armistice of January 11th was anything but a complete defeat for EAM - ELAS which dominated most of the country. The KKE and EAM maintained influence over the majority of the popular masses, while ELAS continued to rally the bulk of its forces.
Thus, the Varkiza compromise not only did not correspond to the correlation of forces, but - mainly - to the needs of the class struggle at that time, which was the exploitation of the revolutionary conditions that had formed after the liberation.
The main problem was the KKE's pursuit of unity with the bourgeois forces or part of those that were defined as anti-fascist, at a time when they, without any illusions, were preparing by all means the crushing of itself and the workers' - popular forces. A pursuit that had already developed since the period of the Occupation with key stages the subordination of ELAS to the Middle East Headquarters and the Lebanon and Caserta Agreements, as well as during the Liberation, with the participation of EAM in the "National Unity" government of G. Papandreou.
Within this framework, even the December confrontation was understood by the KKE as a means of pressure in the direction of democratic normalization and not as a struggle for the abolition of capitalist power. As a continuation of the above, therefore, the signing of the Varkiza Agreement was estimated to pave the way for a democratic normalization.
Of course, ultimately, the bourgeois forces used the Agreement in order to complete the crushing of the workers' - people's movement, while bourgeois state and parastate terrorism began to flare up barely 24 hours after its signing.
However, even after the Varkiza Agreement, the KKE ultimately did not submit and, albeit with a relative delay, organized the three-year armed popular struggle of the Democratic Army of Greece.
It thus left a significant legacy for the following decades until today, since faced with the dilemma of "submission or organization of the struggle and counterattack", the KKE and the popular movement chose the second path. While it demonstrated in practice that any concessions were not the result of compromise with the class opponent, but strategic mistakes, which arose from the lack of corresponding programmatic readiness and revolutionary orientation together with other factors, which the KKE has collectively studied and captured along with timely conclusions in its documents and elaborations, such as the volumes of the History Essay.
The Agreement was preceded by the unfavorable outcome of the battle of Athens and Piraeus during the critical class conflict of December 1944. However, the armistice of January 11th was anything but a complete defeat for EAM - ELAS which dominated most of the country. The KKE and EAM maintained influence over the majority of the popular masses, while ELAS continued to rally the bulk of its forces.
Thus, the Varkiza compromise not only did not correspond to the correlation of forces, but - mainly - to the needs of the class struggle at that time, which was the exploitation of the revolutionary conditions that had formed after the liberation.
The main problem was the KKE's pursuit of unity with the bourgeois forces or part of those that were defined as anti-fascist, at a time when they, without any illusions, were preparing by all means the crushing of itself and the workers' - popular forces. A pursuit that had already developed since the period of the Occupation with key stages the subordination of ELAS to the Middle East Headquarters and the Lebanon and Caserta Agreements, as well as during the Liberation, with the participation of EAM in the "National Unity" government of G. Papandreou.
Within this framework, even the December confrontation was understood by the KKE as a means of pressure in the direction of democratic normalization and not as a struggle for the abolition of capitalist power. As a continuation of the above, therefore, the signing of the Varkiza Agreement was estimated to pave the way for a democratic normalization.
Of course, ultimately, the bourgeois forces used the Agreement in order to complete the crushing of the workers' - people's movement, while bourgeois state and parastate terrorism began to flare up barely 24 hours after its signing.
However, even after the Varkiza Agreement, the KKE ultimately did not submit and, albeit with a relative delay, organized the three-year armed popular struggle of the Democratic Army of Greece.
It thus left a significant legacy for the following decades until today, since faced with the dilemma of "submission or organization of the struggle and counterattack", the KKE and the popular movement chose the second path. While it demonstrated in practice that any concessions were not the result of compromise with the class opponent, but strategic mistakes, which arose from the lack of corresponding programmatic readiness and revolutionary orientation together with other factors, which the KKE has collectively studied and captured along with timely conclusions in its documents and elaborations, such as the volumes of the History Essay.
