A
Riposte to Stephen Kotkin’s ‘Stalin: Waiting for Hitler,
1929-1941’
By
Raj Sahai*.
Source: Marxism-Leninism today.
Princeton
University historian Stephen Kotkin is writing a monumental
three-volume biography of Joseph Stalin. Kotkin’s is the latest in
a large number of books on Stalin, starting with Isaac Deutscher in
1949. So, why yet another book on Stalin?
Kotkin
says Stalin represents a “gold standard” in “personal
dictatorship”, and more archival documents are now accessible, so
now a definitive biography of Stalin can finally be written. He takes
Isaac Deutscher’s three-volume biography of Trotsky as a model for
his own work. Published in 2015, Kotkin’s first volume was titled
‘Stalin: Paradoxes of Power 1878 - 1928’. Volume 2, published in
November 2017, is titled ‘Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929 –
1941’.
In this second volume Kotkin describes in great detail the three major developments in this crucial 12-year period: Collectivization of Agriculture 1929-1933; The Great Purge1936-1938; and diplomacy and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact signed in August 1939. Germany invaded U.S.S.R. on the early morning of June 22, 1941.
Imperialists
Try to Smother the Socialist Baby
The
U.S.S.R. was the first socialist country, emerging from the ruins of
the First World War. It was immediately plunged into a bitter
civil war during which armies from fourteen countries occupied the
former Russian Empire’s territory in support of the defeated
Russian landlords and capitalists. A further humiliation to the
fledgling Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was
the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty negotiated with Germany in March 1918,
obliging it to pay Germany war reparations and to cede a million
square miles of territory, with 55 million habitants, to Germany or
its sphere of influence, including the breadbasket of Ukraine.
Anti-Communist
Kotkin Theses
Unlike
historian Isaac Deutscher, who also wrote a biography of Stalin
published in 1949, Kotkin is an unabashed anti-communist, who thinks
Marxism is “idealism”. So, while Marxism aims for a society free
of exploitation and oppression, Kotkin argues, its theory and
practices are so blind, that it always ends up in despotism, while
“promising heaven on earth”. Kotkin admits that Stalin had a
normal childhood, that he was a good student, and that he was a
dedicated revolutionary communist and a faithful follower of Marx and
Lenin. Kotkin admits Stalin gained power legitimately, because he was
a dedicated communist and who worked very hard. Kotkin also admits
Stalin led a historic project that greatly improved the material
lives of the vast majority of people in the former Russian Empire,
won the Second World War, and built an industrial economy. But he
claims Stalin, while of iron will, was a paranoid idealist who
murdered his fellow Party leaders just for a difference of opinion or
not even any reason, killed dedicated innocent cadres, competent and
loyal military officers and even loyal policemen – those in the
NKVD; all in such large numbers, that he seriously weakened the state
he headed – in short, he was a “sociopath”. Kotkin claims
Stalin got away with it because the Russian working class too was
paranoid.
Kotkin’s
book on Stalin is being promoted by the most prominent of U.S.
institutions which form the intellectual core of imperialism: the
Hoover Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations , and several
prestigious universities, where he has delivered many lectures,
besides public libraries and book stores. Both of these two volumes
have been reviewed by New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street
Journal and the Guardian (UK), and the reviewers agree Stalin was a
“murderous despot”. Kotkin is an engaging speaker - folksy, witty
and charming.
The
1154-page second volume contains thousands of references. There are a
lot of details and personal anecdotes in the book: what was served at
banquets, the wines Stalin liked, which movies he liked and watched
dozens of times, his favorite music, his singing and dancing, and his
personal life: his relationship with his wife and children.
Stalin’s
ghost haunts the U.S. ruling class today, as the specter of Communism
did European rulers in 1848. Over the past three decades, the lives
of the majority of workers in the US have become increasingly more
precarious due to automation and export of industrial jobs to
low-wage countries that have reduced industrial well-paid jobs and
pushed the workforce towards low-wage, often temporary work. The
Presidential election in 2016 showed a significant section of the
U.S. population beginning to take a second look at socialism. The
other developing trend is white-nationalism –a racist trend which
could develop into fascism.
This
essay examines Kotkin’s anti-communist theses and his conclusions
on this crucial period of Soviet history.
Bourgeois
Denial of Class
Kotkin
claims Stalin the “dictator” “forced collectivization” on the
120 million peasants to bring the conservative peasant society to
modernity. He ridicules the “idealism” of Marxism, in which the
“six-cow-owning peasants” (kulaks) were considered capitalists
while “three-cow-owning peasants” (mid-level, i.e., family
farmers) did not! In doing so, Kotkin claims Stalin sent millions to
gulags where he claims a lot of them perished. But Kotkin misses the
main point: kulaks exploited landless peasants’ labor – and there
were 5 million of them! This leads him into a false narrative, an
ugly caricature of reality. But what then is the truth?
Capitalist
Sabotage, Civil War and the New Economic Policy
Many
Russian industrialists had severely sabotaged their own factories
before escaping with their money to Western Europe and the U.S. after
the confiscation of their properties following the 1917 revolution.
Most well-paid managers and engineers also left the country along
with the capitalists to settle in Western Europe and the United
States. During the civil war “War Communism” of 1918-21, out of
dire necessity, there was enforced collection of grain from the
peasants, who were paid in the new Red Ruble, but with which they
could not buy many factory products they needed – implements for
their work and other consumer products because by 1921, industrial
production had plummeted to barely 12 percent of what it was in the
pre-World War-I year of 1913. The war with Germany and the civil war
following the revolution had caused disruption of agricultural
production as well, which further exacerbated the famines that were
endemic for centuries throughout the Russian Empire. As a result of
these conditions, the workers in the cities were literally starving,
as portrayed in Boris Pasternak’s ‘Dr. Zhivago’.
The
New Economic Policy (NEP), replacing war-communism was adopted in
1921 by the Bolshevik government to jumpstart the economy that was so
severely disrupted by the revolution and the Civil War. It allowed
the peasants to sell their surplus grain in the market for profit.
The situation improved considerably with the NEP - agriculture and
industrial production both revived by 1925. On the other hand,
profits from the market trading of grain had enriched and also
politically emboldened the Kulaks.
Right
and Left Wing Oppositions Failed to Grasp Economic Reality
The
kulaks were supported in the press by the Right Opposition: Bukharin,
Rykov and trade union leader, Tomskii. Bukharin in 1925 exhorted the
peasants to “enrich yourselves”, but only the kulaks had the
means to do so – by exploitation of hired labor. The “Left
Opposition” (led by Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev), wanted rapid
industrialization sooner and was opposed to NEP after Lenin’s death
in 1924. But until there was enough capacity to produce tractors, NEP
was a necessity, since heavy industrialization was impossible without
imported machinery for which hard cash was needed. By 1927, kulaks
began resisting the sale of their surplus grain at fixed prices to
the state, which besides feeding the workers machinery damaged by
sabotage and build new factories for tractors and other industrial
products. However, until the first Five-Year plan was launched in
1928, even though industry was restored to its 1913 capacity, it was
still mostly light (consumer) industry. Since credit was generally
not available, a much greater agricultural surplus was needed to
trade it with foreign countries to buy machinery to build heavy
industry , so that the U.S.S.R. could become a modern industrial
country like its major capitalist rivals, and escape the subjugation
or overthrow of socialism by the imperialist countries.
A
Limited Window of Time
Winston
Churchill, the conservative later to become the British Prime
Minister, aware that Britain had become a debtor nation in trying to
contain the popular rebellions in its colonial empire, egged on the
U.S. to do the “smothering of the socialist baby”. The U.S. today
is a debtor, but in 1918 was a creditor country. But the half-starved
workers in socialist Russia led by the Bolsheviks defeated all the
occupiers and created a socialist union of Russia and former
oppressed nations in 1922, the U.S.S.R., based on Stalin’s ably
drafted constitution providing the former oppressed nations a
collective veto power over Russia, so the Russian politicians and
bureaucrats could not dominate them under socialism as they did under
Czarism. The imperialist war had exhausted all of the European
capitalist countries. Workers in these countries while too weak to
overthrow capitalism, had a soft heart for the U.S.S.R. where workers
like themselves were now the new ruling class. The capitalist
countries’ workers were also highly organized, so their capitalist
leaders were afraid to push them into a new war, fearing it could
result in their own ouster as had happened in Russia recently. This
window of time was limited so the Party was wise to use it to take
advantage of it, but conditions would not allow it before 1929.
Collectivization
of Agriculture a Necessity for Industrialization
The
redistribution of agricultural land appropriated from the nobility,
was a promise to the landless peasants by the Bolsheviks before the
revolution, and it was carried out during the Civil War period. This
created many more small farmers, reducing the number of landless
peasants. But by 1927, the production in food grains was still only
90%[1] of
what it was in pre-war year of 1913. Collectivization was the logical
answer. In the U.S., collectivization had also taken place, but
within a capitalist model: small family farms were decimated leading
to the infamous Dust Bowl migration of small family farmers in
1930’s, unable to compete with large scale corporate farms.[2]
Stalin
in 1927 argued that for the U.S.S.R. to achieve socialism,
collectivization of farm land could be done only on a socialist
basis, otherwise developing capitalist agriculture would undermine
socialism. Further, socialist style collective agriculture could be
carried out on a mass scale only when the modern farm machinery
became available on large scale, which became possible by 1930. For
Kotkin this collectivization of agricultural lands was unnecessary.
He forgets what happened just 13 years earlier, and claims this
“unnecessary collectivization mistake” led Stalin then to
“murder” all of his opponents in the party in the 1930s, and many
even of his strong supporters who could potentially challenge his
“personal dictatorship”! Kotkin is absurdly wrong!
Defeat
of “Left Opposition”
Trotsky,
Zinoviev and Kamenev, leaders of the so called “Left Opposition”,
prepared a separate platform in 1927, which argued for greater worker
benefits. They criticized the Party platform as favoring the kulaks
in continuing the NEP – but middle farmers had not fully recovered.
Stalin citing Lenin argued that worker-peasant alliance was of
strategic importance to building socialism in the U.S.S.R., so ending
the NEP at this stage would break the alliance. The oppositionists
claimed the workers were with them, not Stalin-led wing of the Party.
The
Party responded by providing all party cells in the entire country
with copies of the Party platform as well as opposition platform: to
study, debate and then vote. Roughly three quarters cast their votes:
Oppositionists received 4,000, the Party 724,000 votes. Although
completely routed, the Oppositionists did not give up the struggle.
They organized a counter-demonstration on the massively attended
Tenth Anniversary celebration of revolution, drawing very few
workers. This was the last straw in their repeated factionalism, in
which they had indulged despite the ban on forming factions that was
passed in the 10th Congress in 1921, moved by a frustrated Lenin
himself. The oppositionists were thrown out of the Party by the 15th
Party Congress in December 1927. Others renounced their “Left”
oppositionist views and were readmitted, but Trotsky refused.
Consequently, he was exiled first internally to Alma Ata in
Kazakhstan and later from the U.S.S.R. to Turkey in 1929.
Collectivization
Decision
The
collectivization decision was debated vigorously and then voted on
and adopted in open sessions of the 15th Party Congress held in
December 1927. Right Opposition leaders Rykov, Bukharin and Tomskii
then were still prominent party members – in fact, Politburo
members in 1927. As such, they had an equal chance to persuade the
Congress to vote against collectivization. They did but their
arguments were rejected by the Congress. The reason the Party
Congress adopted the program of collectivization was because of the
validity of Stalin’s arguments, not because of he was a “dictator”.
Party
Cadres Support Stalin’s Vision
Kotkin
also believes, as did Trotsky and his followers to this day, that the
party was filled with those for whom Stalin, “the bureaucrat” did
favors as General Secretary, or because he controlled the police or
other levers of power. This is not true; it was rather that Stalin
was a visionary thinker; he understood that industrialization could
not succeed on the scale needed to alleviate poverty, build a
socialist society backed by a credible military force without
building heavy industry infrastructure and for which, much a greater
agricultural surplus was needed. Machine tools could be purchased
only from advanced industrialized countries. Industrialization could
not be achieved without sufficient number of peasants freed from the
small labor -intensive farms to work in the new industry. The
Bolshevik Party also knew from Russian history and from experience
that failure to rapidly industrialize would result in the defeat of
socialism and return to the rule of domestic and foreign landlords
and capitalists. Kotkin, blind to real nature of imperialism, can’t
see this harsh reality.
Kulaks
Political Isolation Prepares the Ground for Collectivization
Bolshevik
Party history states “in answer to the kulaks' refusal to sell
their grain surplus to the state at the fixed prices, the Party and
the Government adopted a number of emergency measures against the
kulaks in 1928. They applied Article 107 of the Criminal Code
empowering the courts to confiscate grain surplus from kulaks and NEP
profiteers in case they refused to sell them to the state at the
fixed prices, and granted the poor peasants a number of privileges,
under which 25 per cent of the confiscated kulak grain was placed at
their disposal. These emergency measures had their effect: the poorer
and middle peasants joined in the resolute fight against the kulaks;
the kulaks were isolated, and the resistance of the kulaks and the
profiteers was broken.”[3]Collectivization
could now begin. Kotkin ignores real history, instead invents one of
his own.
Heavy
Industrialization and Collectivization Advance
Heavy
industry infrastructure construction began in 1928, which began
drawing workers from the countryside. Within five years, a new
country was emerging on the basis of socialist industrialization and
collectivized farming. Workers were enthusiastically building their
own future in a country they owned. Industrial workers in the
U.S.S.R. were closely connected to the villages from where they came
and to which they maintained connection, so their enthusiasm at the
success of building the modern industrial plants could not but infect
the poor peasants in the countryside with it. One example of this was
the giant Magnitogorsk Iron & Steel Plant in Chelyabinsk located
east of the Ural Mountains, which started construction in 1929 and
began producing steel by 1933[4].
In
the countryside, poor peasants began to join collective farms
voluntarily, which were supplied tractors, money, and counsel by the
workers state, improving their working conditions and making their
efforts more productive. This reality, easily comprehended by poor
Russian peasants who wanted the change in their lives from that of
drudgery, poverty, sickness and premature death to that of food
security, health care and dignity in a collective effort to achieve
it – is beyond comprehension by our bourgeois professor.
During
the worldwide Great Depression of the 1930’s, in which the
socialist Soviet economy was an exception, there was a retail store
cooperative movement in the U.S. The U.S. workers did not own the
state, or the economy. What drove U.S. workers to the cooperative
movement was the failure of capitalism. Capitalism in the U.S.S.R.
had only used the poor peasants to supply food and war conscripts,
which had devastated peasant life. Little surprise, then, that they
would welcome socialist cooperative agriculture. In 1928 the total
crop area of the collective farms in the U.S.S.R. was 1.4 million
hectares. By 1929 it grew to 4.3 million hectares, while in 1930 it
reached 15 million hectares.[5] This
was the beginning of the mass collective movement in Soviet farming,
generally all-voluntary, encouraged and supported by the workers
state. At this point the Communist Party took the next logical step.
Next
Step - Elimination of Kulaks as a Class
At
the end of 1929, with the growth of both the collective farms and
state farms, the Soviet Government turned sharply from a policy of
restricting the kulaks (capping the extent of their wealth, land
holdings, labor hiring, etc.) to a policy of eliminating the kulak as
a class. It repealed laws on the renting of land and the hiring of
labor, thus depriving the kulaks of land and of hired laborers. It
lifted the ban on the expropriation of the kulaks. It permitted the
poor peasants’ committees to confiscate cattle, farm machinery and
other farm property from the kulaks for the benefit of the collective
farms.
In
1929, the kulaks comprised less than five percent of the peasant
population of the U.S.S.R., but owned a third of the farm animals.
Middle peasants (self-employed farmers, owning several farm animals)
comprised about twenty percent. The remaining seventy five percent of
the peasant population were either the poor peasants (up to one farm
animal), unable to survive on their lands’ yields, so performed
part-time labor for others, or were landless peasants who worked
full-time on the kulak farms.
Poor
Peasant Committees, formed in the revolution, now moved to confiscate
kulak lands and animals for collectivization, but it was not without
a fight put up by the kulaks, who had guns, goons and money on their
side. The better off sections of the middle peasants also joined the
kulaks, so it was a class-war between the 18 - 20 percent upper crust
of the peasantry pitted against the lower around 80 -82 percent. This
upper crust of peasants owned more than half of all farm animals, and
since they could not sell them, they chose to slaughter their animals
and burn their seeds in storage sheds rather than give it to
collective farms. For these crimes, 400,000 kulaks and their
families, not all of the kulaks, were forcibly moved to work camps,
“gulags”, where they suffered in the primitive conditions, and
many died. But these were work-camps, not concentration camps, in
which the Nazis killed people deliberately.
For
the kulak families, Kotkin has a lot of sympathy, but the suffering
and early deaths of the half-starved poor peasants prior to the
collectivization was something “natural”, so it goes unnoticed by
him. For Kotkin, the capture of the state by the Russian workers was
not a revolution but a “coup”. Little surprise then that he sees
the collectivization as “enslavement” of the entire peasantry,
while in reality it was the liberation of over 80% of the peasants
from hunger, deprivation, back-breaking dawn-to-dusk work; and a
chance to advance themselves to literacy, education and thus to
civilization.
Collectivization
Ended Famines and Facilitated Industrialization
Finally,
according to Kotkin, collectivization of agriculture did not
significantly advance productivity. That claim also is false.
Although the disruptions to agriculture caused by the Second Civil
War that collectivization generated, as the kulaks resisted
expropriation, food production did suffer, yet on the whole and in
any case within 4 years, it was more than made up and it went on to
create significant grain surpluses. In Ukraine and in part of
Belarus, the famine of 1932 was largely, if not entirely, the result
of climate conditions.[6] The
government took active steps to alleviate it. By 1934, the situation
had returned to normal and after that no famines occurred except in
1946, which was a result of the war destruction.
How
else can anyone explain the huge amounts of grains sold to Germany in
the mid-1930s up until the first half of 1941, in trade for large
purchases of machinery that Kotkin himself records in his book?
Kotkin writes that even up to the day of attack, June 22, 1941, “A
little after midnight, a train carrying Soviet oil, manganese, and
grain crossed the frontier into Greater Germany, its passage observed
by waiting German divisions[7].
In fact, the Nazi invaders’ humiliating defeat was due to the rapid
industrialization of the U.S.S.R., which in turn was made possible by
the collectivized agriculture.
In
the plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control
Commission of the Party, held in January 1933, Stalin reviewed the
results of the First Five-Year Plan. The report stated, that the
collective farm system had put an end to poverty and want in the
countryside, and tens of millions of poor peasants had risen to a
level of material security.[8] By
June 1941, when Germany invaded the U.S.S.R., the USSR had become a
predominantly industrial economy and famines had become history.
Kotkin attempts to make this great achievement of socialism into its
opposite.
The
Great Purge
According
to Kotkin, the great purge of 1936-38 originates in the “paranoia”
of the new workers state, which had destroyed and displaced
capitalism and democracy in Russia. “The first casualty of this
paranoia was OGPU spy Yakov Blyumkin for meeting exiled Trotsky in
Turkey, his former patron, who revealed that he had managed to carry
out secret documents, which he intended to publish to expose Stalin,
and predicted the regime’s downfall, averring that “the
underground “Bolshevik-Leninists” needed to strengthen their
opposition”[9].
This confirms Trotsky remained an enemy of the new state.
Resolute
Determination
It
was in fact not paranoia, but rather the resolute determination of
the new state of workers that it would harshly punish anyone who
conspired to overthrow it. History’s second worker state was not
yet strong enough to sustain such opposition without running the risk
of being overthrown. Bolsheviks were acutely aware of the history of
the first workers state, the Paris Commune of 1871, which was
mercilessly crushed, and thousands of workers slaughtered by the
propertied classes, because the Communards failed to act resolutely
against their enemy.
And
could Russian workers forget that their new-born state was attacked
by armies of the former landlords in the Civil War, backed by 14
powerful capitalist countries, who invaded and occupied Soviet Russia
right after the October 1917 revolution? It is why workers trusted
Stalin – he personified their resolve. They were ready to make all
the necessary sacrifices, as they in fact did in the Civil War and
later in World War II.
Marxism
Fights Capitalist Exploitation and Imperialist Domination
For
Kotkin, the terms ‘exploitation’, ‘class struggle’,
‘capitalism’, ‘imperialism’ are all ridiculous, a figment of
imagination conceived by Marx and Lenin to create what he mockingly
calls a “paradise on earth”. He subscribes to the “end of
history” thesis, by which capitalism and bourgeois democracy,
manipulated by the mass media owned by the capitalist class,
expresses the “highest” and “best” development of human
civilization, and “best governance”. So, for him and his
bourgeois readers, the phrase ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’
can only mean dictatorship by an individual, but in fact, here it is
Stalin only as representative of the iron will of the vast majority,
not as a “despot”. Stalin himself would have suffered the same
fate, had he deviated from the path of socialism, such was the stage
of the revolution in 1930s, as in fact happened to some other
prominent leaders. Blinded by his own ideology, Kotkin proceeds to
give Stalin a “promotion”: from a “dictator” to a “despot”
as the repressions of 1936-38 period unfolded. But what are the
facts?
Kirov
Assassination Conspiracy Launches Repressions
On
December 1, 1934, Sergei Mironovich Kirov, First Secretary of the
Communist Party in Leningrad Province was assassinated by a Party
member and unemployed worker, Leonid Nikolaev. Arrested on the scene,
Nikolaev at first claimed that he killed Kirov in order to ‘shake
up’ the party from its insensitivity towards workers like himself.
However, within one week, he admitted he did not act alone, but
rather was part of a conspiracy of a clandestine group of Party
members opposed to Stalin and favoring Zinoviev.
Why?
Zinoviev had been replaced by Kirov as Leningrad Party leader in
1926. Kotkin, believes Nicolaev killed Kirov for personal reasons.
Kotkin further claims Stalin set up Nikolaev in order to destroy his
opponents, Zinoviev and Kamenev and that Stalin later used Kirov’s
murder to unleash terror in 1936 that led to the deaths of many other
Party leaders and state officials, so that he could become an
absolute dictator, i.e., a “despot”. Kotkin ignores the fact that
because of lack of concrete evidence available to the prosecutor,
Zinoviev and Kamenev, who were tried for being leaders of the
conspiracy that led to Kirov’s death, were not convicted of the
conspiracy to commit the murder, but on a lesser charge of ‘moral
responsibility’ for creating anti-party moods in the workers.
Zinoviev’s
‘Left Opposition’ in 1926-27 had claimed that Stalin- led party
was not doing enough for the workers, instead was letting kulaks get
rich. Following Hitler becoming the Chancellor in Germany in January
1933, workers in the U.S.S.R. worked longer hours and were required
to invest part of their earnings in state defense bonds, which
lowered their living standard. Nicolaev and his co-conspirators were
among workers in St. Petersburg and Moscow, who believed that the
government was misdirecting funds for unnecessary defense rather than
improve workers living standards. Convicted on moral responsibility
for creating anti-party moods, Zinoviev and Kamenev were sentenced to
5-year prison terms. Iagoda (Yagoda), who was the NKVD (State
Security Bureau) head in 1934 was replaced by Yezhov in 1936 for his
neglect in providing adequate protection to Kirov. He was later
arrested and in the Third Moscow Trial (1938) of the Right
Oppositionists, where he was a defendant. Iagoda testified that he
knew of Nicolaev’s intent to assassinate Kirov but did not take
steps to prevent it because he was part of the Right Oppositionists
who also wanted Stalin overthrown[10].
Kirov’s assassination was just the first revelation of a great
conspiracy which began in 1932.
Moscow
Trials
For
Kotkin, as for all other anti-communist scholars, the three Moscow
trials of prominent Communist Party members were “staged”, the
testimonies of scores of defendants “scripted” by the NKVD, and
the defendants all “innocent”, “framed” in “show trials”.
But anyone who has read the verbatim trial transcripts as I have,
could never honestly agree to these characterizations. Nor could any
honest reader of the trial transcripts come away believing that the
defendants were innocent but forced to incriminate themselves in
capital crimes.
Instead,
one finds in the transcripts that there is actually an over-abundance
of evidence: numerous witnesses providing extensive details that fit
the puzzle of the complex crime picture, revealing interconnections
between actions of various defendants, further corroborated by
independent material evidence, both within and outside the borders of
the USSR that establishes the validity of the trials[11].
US
Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Joseph E. Davies, a former Pennsylvania
State Prosecutor who attended the 1937 and 1938 Moscow Trial sessions
himself, sent confidential reports to Secretary of State Cordell
Hull, concluded[12] that
the trials established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants
in the three Moscow Trials were indeed guilty of the crimes for which
the state had indicted them. He correctly concluded that the Soviet
State eliminated the Fifth Column just in time before the war. It was
not until Khrushchev’s 1956 “secret speech” that the impetus
was given to change this history and promote the myth that the Moscow
trials were ‘kangaroo court’ affairs.[13]
Numbers
of Innocent Victims
Finally,
on the issue of repressions, most readers accept fantastic numbers
when it comes to Stalin-era history which declares that everyone who
either died or suffered in the Gulags were innocent victims. Kotkin
claims 1.1 million were sent to Gulags and additional 634,000
executed in the Great Purge of 1937-38. Mario Sousa estimates the
number of people executed in the period of 1936-38 to be around
100,000.[14] The
source for Kotkin’s numbers is the KGB of Boris Yeltsin’s
presidency, not the Soviet KGB of the pre-1953 era. The numbers are
suspicious, and the KGB was not free from politics on either side of
1953.
But
even if 634,000 executions are in fact true, were they all innocent?
Not likely. It is more likely that more than half of them were guilty
of general categories of serious crimes, such as murder, violent rape
(violent rape was punishable in many countries by death in the early
20th century, not just in the USSR), etc. Of the rest who were
executed for political crimes, many were guilty of economic sabotage,
and in fact, as evidence presented showed, were working with high
party and state officials who were in league with the exiled Trotsky
as confirmed by two U.S. engineers, John D. Littlepage[15] and
Carroll G. Holmes[16],
who worked in Soviet industries in the 1930s.
A
third group was of totally innocent persons who were killed in the
proceedings of the emergency NKVD troikas [three-person commissions]
in which the troika judges themselves were part of the conspiracy.
These hasty and unjust troika decisions were motivated by a desire to
cover their own tracks, showing themselves to be a vigilant party
members. Unbeknownst to Stalin and the Politburo until the autumn of
1938, they attempted to create dissatisfaction in the general public
against the Party headed by Stalin. And finally, many innocents also
perished in this situation because of plain incompetence and mistakes
of the NKVD. This was a class war that began in 1917 and it was not
over until 1940.
Oppositionists’
Lack of Faith on Building Socialism led to Conspiracy
The
old political oppositionists within the Party lacked faith in the
difficult project of building socialism. So, when the state and party
faced a second civil war during collectivization, they concluded all
was lost, and so they sought compromise with German leaders, because
they were convinced the U.S.S.R. could not win a war with Germany.
They thought they would ‘save’ the country by making some
accommodations with the German enemy, and by the way, also avenge
their political defeat, which had embittered them. It is in this
period of turmoil, 1931-32, that Trotsky began rebuilding his network
of former politically defeated oppositionists, who had since
renounced their views and were working for Stalin government; with
the express purpose of “removing” Stalin and his allies. These
included Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskii at
the top in a conspiracy with Tukhachevskii and others in the military
high command[17].
Kirov’s assassination revealed the plot, which gave Yezhov the
power he otherwise would not have had, but unbeknownst to Stalin and
his loyal supporters, he too was enmeshed in the conspiracy, along
with some of his top subordinates.
Excesses
in the repressions certainly occurred, but not because Stalin wanted
be a “despot”, as Kotkin alleges, but due to urgency of the
moment, when the military plot was revealed in 1937. According to
former foreign minister Molotov, “...But we could have suffered
greater losses in the war – perhaps even defeat – if the
leadership had flinched and had allowed internal disagreements, like
cracks in a rock…”[18].
The question was not if, but when the USSR would be attacked.
Innocents
also died in the U.S. Civil War. Can the burning of Atlanta, Georgia
by General Sherman to break the Confederacy’s will to fight on
before the November 1864 election be called anything other than
deliberate killing of the civilian population and revolutionary
terror? Yet Abraham Lincoln is not judged to be a brutal man and no
one claims he killed innocents to impose his personal will in the
service of capitalist ideology. Lincoln did not kill his own party
members, it is true, but was assassinated himself instead.
Irresolution has consequences. Compromise with the slave-owning South
haunts U.S. democracy to this day in the form of the ‘Electoral
College’. After the defeat of Reconstruction in 1876, the slave
landlords retained their former property, to be exploited as
sharecroppers not slaves.
Truth
Begins to Filter Out
Arseny
Roginsky founded ‘The Memorial Society’ in the U.S.S.R. in 1980s,
an anti-communist organization funded by foreign NGOs. Roginsky and
his father had served time in jail during the repressions, but here
is what he himself said on March 25, 2012 before his death:
“…according to my calculations, in the entire history of Soviet
power, from 1918 to 1987 (the last arrests were in early 1987),
according to the surviving documents, it turned out that 7.1 million
people were arrested by security agencies across the country. At the
same time, among them were arrested -- and quite a lot -- not only
for political crimes. Yes, they were arrested by security agencies,
but security agencies arrested people for banditry, smuggling,
counterfeiting, and for many other "general-purpose"
crimes.”[19]
That
averages 100,000 arrests per year in a country of 170 million, with
intense class struggles, building socialism and fighting a powerful
foreign invader. How does this compare with the US? In 2010 alone,
the number of arrests in the US for all crime categories was 13.1
million[20].
The average number of arrests per year 1990-2010 period was
approximately 11 million. It is true that 634,000 executions do not
have a parallel in the U.S. Civil War. However, the U.S. was not
surrounded by powerful hostile countries preparing to invade and
destroy it, as was the U.S.S.R. in 1917 and over most of its its
74-year existence.
The
U.S. population in 2010 was approximately twice that of the U.S.S.R.
in 1937. The arrest rate in the U.S. in 2010 was four percent, in a
year of comparative peace and security in a wealthy capitalist
country. In the U.S.S.R, during the worst year when several dangerous
conspiracies were uncovered, and when Nazi Germany was preparing for
attack, the rate of arrests was 1.7 million out of 170 million, i.e.,
1%. What then explains this big difference? It is that under
socialism, social stress was much less as people were living in a
society where the basic needs of all citizens were generally met, and
no one was filthy rich. But in the mind of anti-communist Kotkin,
that issue does not come up.
Kotkin
is at loss to understand the repressions in the party, the military
and the NKVD, which enforced the repressions. He thinks it was a
result of paranoia in Stalin’s mind, and thinks that Stalin had so
completely made everyone subservient to him that he could savage the
very people and institutions that he created and helped him retain
power and fight off the external enemies, and yet himself remain
untouched! So, how is it that Stalin could modernize the USSR,
develop science, technology, culture, industry and agriculture in a
backward country and arm it to fight a modern warfare and defeat a
country which was at least 50 years ahead in the same indices and
whose attacks no other country had been able to resist, except for
Britain until then? Britain escaped only because Germany lacked the
Navy to match that of Britain’s, so an invasion was not possible.
False
Theses Leads to False Conclusions
If
seen from a class-conscious point of view as a necessary if a harsh
remedy against real conspiracies, in which some of the conspirator’s
highest-level party members, and some in top positions of the very
agency, the NKVD, that was supposed to be investigating those
conspiracies, all this seeming irrationality disappears!
Kotkin
does not even think this as a possible thesis. Kotkin writes:
“Altogether, more than 100 of the highest-ranking Yezhovites were
massacred— all of his deputies, almost all department heads in the
center, almost all NKVD heads in Union republics and
provinces.”[21] No,
Professor Kotkin, they were not “massacred”, they suffered
capital punishment because they were guilty of violation of the
legitimate orders from above, a violation of socialist legality!
Yezhov had employed his subordinates in the NKVD for his own illegal
repressions, in cahoots with the Rightist conspirators as part of the
Rightist plan along with Hitler’s plan to destabilize the Soviet
government. The Rightists also had ties to foreign
intelligence.[22] While
Stalin did push Yezhov to find the “hidden enemies of the people”,
neither Stalin or the Politburo directed him to kill or otherwise
punish innocent people.
Moral
Responsibility on Unjust Repressions
What
Stalin and the politburo could be blamed for is mistakes and
insufficient oversight of the security services[23].
But it is easy to say this now, when the danger of conspiracies and
war have passed. Stalin should be held morally responsible for the
excesses, the deaths of tens of thousands of innocents in the
repressions, but only morally. Stalin could not be held responsible
for ordering the killing of innocents as Kotkin says he did to become
a “despot”. But if we are to hold Stalin morally responsible in
this case, it should also be recognized that had Stalin acted less
resolutely, dissension in the ranks may have allowed Hitler to
succeed in destroying the USSR, and if not, at the very least,
millions more people could have perished in war. Stalin’s alert and
determined response to the dangers posed by the conspirators saved
not only the Russian people, he saved Europe, if not the entire world
by destroying the Nazi beast.
Diplomacy
and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact
The
U.S.S.R. faced enemies on both its far eastern and its western
borders, with Japan in the East and Germany in the West. Both had
rapidly developed their economies and modernized their militaries in
the first forty years of the 20th century. The U.S.S.R. also faced
enemies in the two biggest colonial powers of the time, Britain and
France, who had lost investments in Russia when the Bolsheviks took
power and whose colonial empires were threatened by the national
liberation commitment of the first workers’ state. The U.S.S.R. was
the leader of the workers of the world, and thus the Third Communist
International (“Comintern”) was very much influenced by the
U.S.S.R. The Comintern was founded in 1919 after the fall of the
Second International when SPD, its largest member, supported war
credits for Germany. For this betrayal Lenin had denounced Kautsky,
leader of the SPD, who until then was the heir apparent to Karl Marx.
Germany and Japan had also signed an anti-Comintern pact in 1936,
which Mussolini’s Italy also signed a year later.
Stalin
had offered France and Britain a mutual defense pact against Germany,
but both demurred, hoping to direct Hitler eastward. The U.S.S.R. in
1936 or 1939 was not ready for war, which it barely was even in 1941.
Stalin had told his party members in 1931: “We
are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must
make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush
us.”[24] Faced
with two powerful enemies, Japan and Germany, with no allies, the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact was signed in 1939, it was not
an alliance that Kotkin falsely alleges, even when he is aware that
Stalin had offered a joint defense against Hitler to both France and
Britain and they paid it back by betrayal: they did not even ask
Stalin to be part of the infamous Munich conference, part of
Czechoslovakia was handed over to Hitler, while the Czech leaders had
no voice in that decision!
The
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was Stalin’s counter-move in response to
that British and French betrayal and it bought needed critical time
for the U.S.S.R. to prepare for the war. It bound Germany and the
U.S.S.R. to not attack each other and provided for smaller countries
acting as buffers, so no surprise attack could be launched by one on
the other. Faced with powerful enemies on the two fronts, what did
anyone expect Stalin to do? Sacrifice the country?
Nor
did it fool Stalin into believing the U.S.S.R. was safe after its
signing, even though Kotkin and all previous bourgeois scholars want
to portray him as a simpleton or as friend of Hitler. Meanwhile, war
preparations in the U.S.S.R. went on furiously. Hitler violated this
pact, and Operation Barbarossa was launched on the early morning of
June 22, 1941, almost exactly 10 years later, just as Stalin had
predicted. Kotkin includes Stalin’s 1931 quote in his book.
However, his bias prevents him from seeing why the fast-paced heavy
industrialization was launched in 1928, and for it to succeed,
agriculture could not be left in the petit bourgeois mode of
production - in small individual farmer’s hands. Stalin, the
visionary Marxist, understood the harsh reality of foreign invasion
was a given. Yet, Kotkin because of his ideological blindfold fails
to see why Stalin was the only one who could lead the new socialist
state through the highly perilous times that lay ahead for the
U.S.S.R.
Why
Hitler Fought a Two-Front War
What
Kotkin does better is explaining what led Hitler to attack the
U.S.S.R. before trying to destroy Britain, once he started the war
against Poland, France and Britain. Hitler, lacking naval power,
could not invade Britain, and Germany’s economy could ill afford a
long war, and needed the resources of Ukraine (grain and industry)
and Baku (oil) to develop the naval power to defeat Britain, allied
as it would be with the other giant, the U.S. He correctly assessed
that Britain will not open a front against Germany while Germany
fought the U.S.S.R., even after France fell. Hitler allowed Britain
to rescue its pinned forces at Dunkirk, which he could easily have
destroyed. It was his attempt at silent bargain with Britain, not to
attack it from the west, while Germany was fighting in the east. So
far, his calculation like the chess player who thinks of combinations
was tactically correct.
His
grave strategic miscalculation was that he and his generals had
convinced themselves that the U.S.S.R. could be defeated within four
months by his superior mobile armed forces. But that miscalculation
from the point of view of Berlin would not be obvious. The Great
Purge had dried up Nazi intelligence operations in the USSR. Hitler’s
Nazi Party had a mystical belief in the superiority of the German
“pure Aryan” race and he lacked hard intelligence which could
have alerted him to the extent of modernization that had taken place
in the U.S.S.R. along with the extent of modern warfare capabilities.
Hitler considered Russian mind as inferior. Hitler did not understand
Marxism, nor does Kotkin.
Nor
is Marxism is based on Hegelian idealist dialectics, as Kotkin
believes, but a materialist one, and has the power to radically
transform the entire society in one generation, uplifting it, for
common good. Kotkin believes Stalin had weakened his military by the
purges among its officer. However, in reality, Stalin had
strengthened his military by getting rid of those who were
ideologically not committed to socialism – and instead had
conspired to overthrow the socialist government[25].
Zhukov, Vatutin, Konev, Chuikov, Rokossovsky, all were committed to
the socialist cause. For Kotkin, what mattered was expertise and
experience, but it is because he fails to see that this war front was
as much ideological as physical.
Marxism
Vanquished National Socialism
Hitler
too had transformed Germany, but it was based on fascism’s inhumane
racial supremacy ideology, not what Stalin had achieved in the
U.S.S.R. Marxism, the new revolutionary social science, which Lenin
had updated for the 20th century, was the constructive, humane
ideology. It is why Germany lost, and Hitler had to commit suicide
and Stalin became leader of half of the world by 1950.
Hegelian
Dialectics and Marxism
Kotkin
ridicules Marxism and its language of dialectics, while marveling at
Hegel’s foresight: “When Hegel famously referred to history as a
“slaughter bench,” he had no idea what he was talking about, and
yet he was right. Partly that was because of the influence of Hegel’s
hazardous ideas on the Marxists: the sophistry known as the
dialectic, the idolatry of the state, the supposed historical
“progress” through the “necessary” actions of great men”[26].
In Kotkin’s world, Hegel can be used where needed to discredit the
communists, while denouncing his influence on Marxism.
But
here is what Karl Marx wrote about Hegelian dialectics: “I
criticized the mystificatory side of the Hegelian dialectic nearly
thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion…. The
mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands by no
means prevents him from being the first to present its general forms
of motion in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is
standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discover the
rational kernel within the mystical shell…. In its rational form it
is a scandal and an abomination to the bourgeoisie and its
doctrinaire spokesmen, because it includes in its positive
understanding of what exists a simultaneous recognition of its
negation, its inevitable destruction; because it regards every
historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in motion, and
therefore grasps its transient aspect as well; and because it does
not let itself be impressed by anything, being in its very essence
critical and revolutionary…. The fact that the movement of
capitalist society is full of contradictions impresses itself most
strikingly on the practical bourgeois in the changes of the periodic
cycle through which modern industry passes, the summit of which is
the general crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although
as yet it is only in its preliminary stages, and by the universality
of its field of action and the intensity of its impact it will drum
dialectics even into the heads of the upstarts in charge of the new
Holy Prussian-German Empire.”[27]
Judging
from what followed, Marx was too optimistic. Those in charge of
empires failed to learn.
* Raj
Sahai is a socialist and anti-war activist, and a member of Institute
for the Critical Study of Society associated with the Niebyl-Proctor
Library in Oakland, California
Endnotes
[1]
History of the Communist Party – Short Course Chapter 10-12
p.286
[2] documented by photographer Dorothea Lange, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dorothea_Lange
[3] History of the Communist Party – Short Course Chapter 10-12 p.292
[4] See Wikipedia - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnitogorsk_Iron_and_Steel_Works
[5] History of the Communist Party – Short Course Chapter 10-12 p.298
[6] Grover Furr: 'Blood Lies' page 134 quoting Mark Tauger in 'The Harvest of 1932 and the Famine of 1933'.
[7] Kotkin, Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, p. 900
[8] The History of the Communist Party – Short Course Ch. 10-12 p. 319
[9] Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, Kotkin p.28
[10] Grover Furr 'The Murder of Sergei Kirov' pages 293-294
[11] Grover Furr, 'Trotsky's Amalgams, V.1
[12] Joseph E. Davies, 'Mission to Moscow 1936-38' p179-184
[13] See the books by Grover Furr, 'Khrushchev Lied' and 'Trotsky's Amalgams'
[14] Mario Sousa, 'Lies Concerning the History of the Soviet Union', p12.
[15] John D. Littlepage, 'In Search of Soviet Gold' p94-p115
[16] Grover Furr, Trotsky's Amalgam, p194-196
[17] See Grover Furr, 'Trotsky Amalgams' Introduction
[18] Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers, p256
[19] http://old.memo.ru/d/124360.html (In Russian)
[20] Howard S. Snyder, 'Arrest in the United States, 1990-2010'
[21] Stephen Kotkin, 'Stalin: Waiting for Hitler', p610
[22] Grover Furr, 'Yezhov vs. Stalin, p111-120, p147-p161
[23] Felix Chuev, 'Molotov Remembers', p256 -p258
[24] http://teacher.sduhsd.net/tpsocialsciences/world_history/totalitarianism_ww2/hardline.htm
[25] https://espressostalinist.com/2013/10/20/grover-furr-new-light-on-old-stories-about-marshal-tukhachevskii-some-documents-reconsidered/
[26] Stephen Kotkin, 'Stalin: Waiting for Hitler', p.302
[27] Karl Marx, 'Capital, V.1' Afterword to the Second German Edition
[2] documented by photographer Dorothea Lange, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dorothea_Lange
[3] History of the Communist Party – Short Course Chapter 10-12 p.292
[4] See Wikipedia - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnitogorsk_Iron_and_Steel_Works
[5] History of the Communist Party – Short Course Chapter 10-12 p.298
[6] Grover Furr: 'Blood Lies' page 134 quoting Mark Tauger in 'The Harvest of 1932 and the Famine of 1933'.
[7] Kotkin, Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, p. 900
[8] The History of the Communist Party – Short Course Ch. 10-12 p. 319
[9] Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, Kotkin p.28
[10] Grover Furr 'The Murder of Sergei Kirov' pages 293-294
[11] Grover Furr, 'Trotsky's Amalgams, V.1
[12] Joseph E. Davies, 'Mission to Moscow 1936-38' p179-184
[13] See the books by Grover Furr, 'Khrushchev Lied' and 'Trotsky's Amalgams'
[14] Mario Sousa, 'Lies Concerning the History of the Soviet Union', p12.
[15] John D. Littlepage, 'In Search of Soviet Gold' p94-p115
[16] Grover Furr, Trotsky's Amalgam, p194-196
[17] See Grover Furr, 'Trotsky Amalgams' Introduction
[18] Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers, p256
[19] http://old.memo.ru/d/124360.html (In Russian)
[20] Howard S. Snyder, 'Arrest in the United States, 1990-2010'
[21] Stephen Kotkin, 'Stalin: Waiting for Hitler', p610
[22] Grover Furr, 'Yezhov vs. Stalin, p111-120, p147-p161
[23] Felix Chuev, 'Molotov Remembers', p256 -p258
[24] http://teacher.sduhsd.net/tpsocialsciences/world_history/totalitarianism_ww2/hardline.htm
[25] https://espressostalinist.com/2013/10/20/grover-furr-new-light-on-old-stories-about-marshal-tukhachevskii-some-documents-reconsidered/
[26] Stephen Kotkin, 'Stalin: Waiting for Hitler', p.302
[27] Karl Marx, 'Capital, V.1' Afterword to the Second German Edition