Joseph V. Stalin- Trotskyism or Leninism?
Speech delivered at the Plenum of the Communist Group in the A.U.C.C.T.U.,
November 19, 1924;
Published on Pravda, No.269,
November 26, 1924.
Published via Marxists Internet Archives.
Comrades,
after Kamenev's comprehensive report there is little left for me to
say. I shall therefore confine myself to exposing certain legends
that are being spread by Trotsky and his supporters about the October
uprising, about Trotsky's role in the uprising, about the Party and
the preparation for October, and so forth. I shall also touch upon
Trotskyism as a peculiar ideology that is incompatible with Leninism,
and upon the Party's tasks in connection with Trotsky's latest
literary pronouncements.
I.
THE FACTS ABOUT THE OCTOBER UPRISING
First
of all about the October uprising. Rumours are being vigorously
spread among members of the Party that the Central Committee as a
whole was opposed to an uprising in October 1917. The usual story is
that on October 10, when the Central Committee adopted the decision
to organise the uprising, the majority of the Central Committee at
first spoke against an uprising, but, so the story runs, at that
moment a worker burst in on the meeting of the Central Committee and
said:
"You
are deciding against an uprising, but I tell you that there will be
an uprising all the same, in spite of everything." And so, after
that threat, the story runs, the Central Committee, which is alleged
to have become frightened, raised the question of an uprising afresh
and adopted a decision to organise it.
This
is not merely a rumour, comrades. It is related by the well-known
John Reed in his book Ten Days. Reed was remote from
our Party and, of course, could not know the history of our secret
meeting on October 10, and, consequently, he was taken in by the
gossip spread by people like Sukhanov. This story was later passed
round and repeated in a number of pamphlets written by Trotskyites,
including one of the latest pamphlets on October written by Syrkin.
These rumours have been strongly supported in Trotsky's latest
literary pronouncements.
It
scarcely needs proof that all these and similar "Arabian Nights"
fairy tales are not in accordance with the truth, that in fact
nothing of the kind happened, nor could have happened, at the meeting
of the Central Committee. Consequently, we could ignore these absurd
rumours; after all, lots of rumours are fabricated in the office
rooms of the oppositionists or those who are remote from the Party.
Indeed, we have ignored them till now; for example, we paid no
attention to John Reed's mistakes and did not take the trouble to
rectify them. After Trotsky's latest pronouncements, however, it is
no longer possible to ignore such legends, for attempts are being
made now to bring up our young people on them and, unfortunately,
some results have already been achieved in this respect. In view of
this, I must counter these absurd rumours with the actual facts.
I take
the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of our Party on
October 10 (23), 1917. Present Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin,
Trotsky, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kollontai, Bubnov,
Sokolnikov, Lomov. The question of the current situation and the
uprising was discussed. After the discussion, Comrade Lenin's
resolution on the uprising was put to the vote. The resolution was
adopted by a majority of 10 against 2. Clear, one would think: by a
majority of 10 against 2, the Central Committee decided to proceed
with the immediate, practical work of organising the uprising. At
this very same meeting the Central Committee elected
a political centre to direct the uprising; this
centre, called the Political Bureau, consisted of Lenin, Zinoviev,
Stalin, Kamenev, Trotsky, Sokolnikov and Bubnov.
Such
are the facts.
These
minutes at one stroke destroy several legends. They destroy the
legend that the majority on the Central Committee was opposed to an
uprising. They also destroy the legend that on the question of the
uprising the Central Committee was on the verge of a split. It is
clear from the minutes that the opponents of an immediate uprising --
Kamenev and Zinoviev -- were elected to the body that was to exercise
political direction of the uprising on a par with those who were in
favour of an uprising. There was no question of a split, nor could
there be.
Trotsky
asserts that in October our Party had a Right wing in the persons of
Kamenev and Zinoviev, who, he says, were almost Social-Democrats.
What one cannot understand then is how, under those circumstances, it
could happen that the Party avoided a split; how it could happen that
the disagreements with Kamenev and Zinoviev lasted only a few days;
how it could happen that, in spite of those disagreements, the Party
appointed these comrades to highly important posts, elected them to
the political centre of the uprising, and so forth. Lenin's
implacable attitude towards Social-Democrats is sufficiently
well-known in the Party; the Party knows that Lenin would not for a
single moment have agreed to have Social-Democratically-minded
comrades in the Party, let alone in highly important posts. How,
then, are we to explain the fact that the Party avoided a split? The
explanation is that in spite of the disagreements, these comrades
were old Bolsheviks who stood on the common ground of Bolshevism.
What was that common ground? Unity of views on the fundamental
questions: the character of the Russian revolution, the driving
forces of the revolution, the role of the peasantry, the principles
of Party leadership, and so forth. Had there not been this common
ground, a split would have been inevitable. There was no split, and
the disagreements lasted only a few days, because, and only because,
Kamenev and Zinoviev were Leninists, Bolsheviks.
Let us
now pass to the legend about Trotsky's special role in the October
uprising. The Trotskyites are vigorously spreading rumours that
Trotsky inspired and was the sole leader of the October uprising.
These rumours are being spread with exceptional zeal by the so-called
editor of Trotsky's works, Lentsner. Trotsky himself, by consistently
avoiding mention of the Party, the Central Committee and the
Petrograd Committee of the Party, by saying nothing about the leading
role of these organisation, in the uprising and vigorously pushing
himself forward as the central figure in the October uprising,
voluntarily or involuntarily helps to spread the rumours about the
special role he is supposed to have played in the uprising. I am far
from denying Trotsky's undoubtedly important role in the uprising. I
must say, however, that Trotsky did not play any special role in the
October uprising, nor could he do so; being chairman of the Petrograd
Soviet, he merely carried out the will of the appropriate Party
bodies, which directed every step that Trotsky took. To philistines
like Sukhanov, all this may seem strange, but the facts, the true
facts, wholly and fully confirm what I say.
Let us
take the minutes of the next meeting of the Central Committee, the
one held on October 16 (29), 1917. Present: the members of the
Central Committee, plus representatives of the Petrograd Committee,
plus representatives of the military organisation, factory
committees, trade unions and the railwaymen. Among those present,
besides the members of the Central Committee, were: Krylenko,
Shotman, Kalinin, Volodarsky, Shlyapnikov, Lacis, and others,
twenty-five in all. The question of the uprising was discussed from
the purely practical-organisational aspect. Lenin's resolution on the
uprising was adopted by a majority of 20 against 2, three abstaining.
A practical centre was elected for the
organisational leadership of the uprising. Who was elected to this
centre? The following five: Sverdlov, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Bubnov,
Uritsky. The functions of the practical centre: to direct all the
practical organs of the uprising in conformity with the directives of
the Central Committee. Thus, as you see, something "terrible"
happened at this meeting of the Central Committee, i.e., "strange
to relate," the "inspirer," the "chief figure,"
the "sole leader" of the uprising, Trotsky, was not elected
to the practical centre, which was called upon to direct the
uprising. How is this to be reconciled with the current opinion about
Trotsky's special role? Is not all this somewhat "strange,"
as Sukhanov, or the Trotskyites, would say? And yet, strictly
speaking, there is nothing strange about it, for neither in the
Party, nor in the October uprising, did Trotsky play
any special role, nor could he do so, for he was a
relatively new man in our Party in the period of October. He, like
all the responsible workers, merely carried out the will of the
Central Committee and of its organs. Whoever is familiar with the
mechanics of Bolshevik Party leadership will have no difficulty in
understanding that it could not be otherwise: it would have been
enough for Trotsky to have gone against the will of the Central
Committee to have been deprived of influence on the course of events.
This talk about Trotsky's special role is a legend that is being
spread by obliging "Party" gossips.
This,
of course, does not mean that the October uprising did not have its
inspirer. It did have its inspirer and leader, but this was Lenin,
and none other than Lenin, that same Lenin whose resolutions the
Central Committee adopted when deciding the question of the uprising,
that same Lenin who, in spite of what Trotsky says, was not prevented
by being in hiding from being the actual inspirer of the uprising. It
is foolish and ridiculous to attempt now, by gossip about Lenin
having been in hiding, to obscure the indubitable fact that the
inspirer of the uprising was the leader of the Party, V. I. Lenin.
Such
are the facts.
Granted,
we are told, but it cannot be denied that Trotsky fought well in the
period of October. Yes, that is true, Trotsky did, indeed, fight well
in October; but Trotsky was not the only one who fought well in the
period of October. Even people like the Left
Socialist-Revolutionaries, who then stood side by side with the
Bolsheviks, also fought well. In general, I must say that in the
period of a victorious uprising, when the enemy is isolated and the
uprising is growing, it is not difficult to fight well. At such
moments even backward people become heroes.
The
proletarian struggle is not, however, an uninterrupted advance, an
unbroken chain of victories. The proletarian struggle also has its
trials, its defeats. The genuine revolutionary is not one who
displays courage in the period of a victorious uprising, but one who,
while fighting well during the victorious advance of the revolution,
also displays courage when the revolution is in retreat, when the
proletariat suffers defeat; who does not lose his head and does not
funk when the revolution suffers reverses, when the enemy achieves
success; who does not become panic-stricken or give way to despair
when the revolution is in a period of retreat. The Left
Socialist-Revolutionaries did not fight badly in the period of
October, and they supported the Bolsheviks. But who does not know
that those "brave" fighters became panic-stricken in the
period of Brest, when the advance of German imperialism drove them to
despair and hysteria. It is a very sad but indubitable fact that
Trotsky, who fought well in the period of October, did not, in the
period of Brest, in the period when the revolution suffered temporary
reverses, possess the courage to display sufficient staunchness at
that difficult moment and to refrain from following in the footsteps
of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Beyond question, that moment
was a difficult one; one had to display exceptional courage and
imperturbable coolness not to be dismayed, to retreat in good time,
to accept peace in good time, to withdraw the proletarian army out of
range of the blows of German imperialism, to preserve the peasant
reserves and, after obtaining a respite in this way, to strike at the
enemy with renewed force. Unfortunately, Trotsky was found to lack
this courage and revolutionary staunchness at that difficult moment.
In
Trotsky's opinion, the principal lesson of the proletarian revolution
is "not to funk" during October. That is wrong, for
Trotsky's assertion contains only a particle of the
truth about the lessons of the revolution. The whole truth
about the lessons of the proletarian revolution is "not to funk"
not only when the revolution is advancing, but also when it is in
retreat, when the enemy is gaining the upper hand and the revolution
is suffering reverses. The revolution did not end with October.
October was only the beginning of the proletarian revolution. It is
bad to funk when the tide of insurrection is rising; but it is worse
to funk when the revolution is passing through severe trials after
power has been captured. To retain power on the morrow of the
revolution is no less important than to capture power. If Trotsky
funked during the period of Brest, when our revolution was passing
through severe trials, when it was almost a matter of "surrendering"
power, he ought to know that the mistakes committed by Kamenev and
Zinoviev in October are quite irrelevant here.
That
is how matters stand with the legends about the October uprising.
II.
THE PARTY AND THE PREPARATION
FOR OCTOBER
Let us
now pass to the question of the preparation for October.
Listening
to Trotsky, one might think that during the whole of the period of
preparation, from March to October, the Bolshevik Party did nothing
but mark time; that it was being corroded by internal contradictions
and hindered Lenin in every way; that, had it not been for Trotsky,
nobody knows how the October Revolution would have ended. It is
rather amusing to hear this strange talk about the Party from
Trotsky, who declares in this same "preface" to Volume III
that "the chief instrument of the proletarian revolution is the
Party," that "without the Party, apart from the Party,
by-passing the Party, with a substitute for the Party, the
proletarian revolution cannot be victorious." Allah himself
would not understand how our revolution could have succeeded if "its
chief instrument" proved to be useless, while success was
impossible, as it appears, "by-passing the Party." But this
is not the first time that Trotsky treats us to oddities. It must be
supposed that this amusing talk about our Party is one of Trotsky's
usual oddities.
Let us
briefly review the history of the preparation for October according
to periods.
1) The
period of the Party's new orientation (March-April). The
major facts of this period:
a) the
overthrow of tsarism;
b) the
formation of the Provisional Government (dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie);
c) the
appearance of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
(dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry);
d) dual
power;
e) the
April demonstration;
f) the
first crisis of power.
The
characteristic feature of this period is the fact that there existed
together, side by side and simultaneously, both the dictatorship of
the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat and
peasantry; the latter trusts the former, believes that it is striving
for peace, voluntarily surrenders power to the bourgeoisie and
thereby becomes an appendage of the bourgeoisie. There are as yet no
serious conflicts between the two dictatorships. On the other hand,
there is the "Contact Committee." [1]
This
was the greatest turning point in the history of Russia and an
unprecedented turning point in the history of our Party. The old,
pre-revolutionary platform of direct overthrow of the government was
clear and definite, but it was no longer suitable for the new
conditions of the struggle. It was now no longer possible to go
straight out for the overthrow of the government, for the latter was
connected with the Soviets, then under the influence of the
defencists, and the Party would have had to wage war against both the
government and the Soviets, a war that would have been beyond its
strength. Nor was it possible to pursue a policy of supporting the
Provisional Government, for it was the government of imperialism.
Under the new conditions of the struggle, the Party had to adopt a
new orientation. The Party (its majority) groped its way towards this
new orientation. It adopted the policy of pressure on the Provisional
Government through the Soviets on the question of peace and did not
venture to step forward at once from the old slogan of the
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry to the new slogan of
power to the Soviets. The aim of this halfway policy was to enable
the Soviets to discern the actual imperialist nature of the
Provisional Government on the basis of the concrete questions of
peace, and in this way to wrest the Soviets from the Provisional
Government. But this was a profoundly mistaken position, for it gave
rise to pacifist illusions, brought grist to the mill of defencism
and hindered the revolutionary education of the masses. At that time
I shared this mistaken position with other Party comrades and fully
abandoned it only in the middle of April, when I associated myself
with Lenin's theses. A new orientation was needed. This new
orientation was given to the Party by Lenin, in his celebrated April
Theses. [2] I
shall not deal with these theses, for they are known to everybody.
Were there any disagreements between the Party and Lenin at that
time? Yes, there were. How long did these disagreements last? Not
more than two weeks. The City Conference of the Petrograd
organisation [3] (in
the latter half of April), which adopted Lenin's theses, marked a
turning point in our Party's development. The All-Russian April
Conference [4] (at
the end of April) merely completed on an all-Russian scale the work
of the Petrograd Conference, rallying nine-tenths of the Party around
this united Party position.
Now,
seven years later, Trotsky gloats maliciously over the past
disagreements among the Bolsheviks and depicts them as a struggle
waged as if there were almost two parties within Bolshevism. But,
firstly, Trotsky disgracefully exaggerates and inflates the matter,
for the Bolshevik Party lived through these disagreements without the
slightest shock. Secondly, our Party would be a caste and not a
revolutionary party if it did not permit different shades of opinion
in its ranks. Moreover, it is well known that there were
disagreements among us even before that, for example, in the period
of the Third Duma, but they did not shake the unity of our Party.
Thirdly, it will not be out of place to ask what was then the
position of Trotsky himself, who is now gloating
so eagerly over the past disagreements among the Bolsheviks.
Lentsner, the so-called editor of Trotsky's works, assures us that
Trotsky's letters from America (March) "wholly anticipated"
Lenin's Letters
From Afar [5] (March),
which served as the basis of Lenin's April Theses. That is what he
says: "wholly anticipated." Trotsky does not object to this
analogy; apparently, he accepts it with thanks. But, firstly,
Trotsky's letters "do not in the least resemble" Lenin's
letters either in spirit or in conclusions, for they wholly and
entirely reflect Trotsky's anti-Bolshevik slogan of "no tsar,
but a workers' government," a slogan which implies a
revolution without the
peasantry. It is enough to glance through these two series of letters
to be convinced of this. Secondly, if what Lentener says is true, how
are we to explain the fact that Lenin on the very next day after his
arrival from abroad considered it necessary to dissociate himself
from Trotsky? Who does not know of Lenin's repeated statements that
Trotsky's slogan: "no
tsar, but a workers' government"
was an attempt "to skip the still unexhausted peasant movement,"
that this slogan meant "playing at the seizure of power by a
workers' government"?
What
can there be in common between Lenin's Bolshevik theses and Trotsky's
anti-Bolshevik scheme with its "playing at the seizure of
power"? And what prompts this passion that some people display
for comparing a wretched hovel with Mont Blanc? For what purpose did
Lentsner find it necessary to make this risky addition to the heap of
old legends about our revolution of still another legend, about
Trotsky's letters from America "anticipating" Lenin's
well-known Letters
From Afar?
No
wonder it is said that an obliging fool is more dangerous than an
enemy.
2) The
period of the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses
(May-August). The major facts of this period:
a) the
April demonstration in Petrograd and the formation of the coalition
government with the participation of "Socialists";
b) the
May Day demonstrations in the principal centres of Russia with the
slogan of "a democratic peace";
c) the
June demonstration in Petrograd with the principal slogan: "Down
with the capitalist ministers!";
d) the
June offensive at the front and the reverses of the Russian army;
e) the
July armed demonstration in Petrograd; the Cadet ministers resign
from the government;
f) counter-revolutionary
troops are called in from the front; the editorial offices
of Pravda are wrecked; the counter-revolution
launches a struggle against the Soviets and a new coalition
government is formed, headed by Kerensky;
g) the
Sixth Congress of our Party, which issues the slogan to prepare for
an armed uprising;
h) the
counter-revolutionary Conference of State and the general strike in
Moscow;
i) Kornilov's
unsuccessful march on Petrograd, the revitalising of the Soviets; the
Cadets resign and a "Directory" is formed.
The
characteristic feature of this period is the intensification of the
crisis and the upsetting of the unstable equilibrium between the
Soviets and the Provisional Government which, for good or evil, had
existed in the preceding period. Dual power has become intolerable
for both sides. The fragile edifice of the "Contact Committee"
is tottering. "Crisis of power" and "ministerial
re-shuffle" are the most fashionable catchwords of the day. The
crisis at the front and the disruption in the rear are doing their
work, strengthening the extreme flanks and squeezing the defencist
compromisers from both sides. The revolution is mobilising, causing
the mobilisation of the counter-revolution. The counter-revolution,
in its turn, is spurring on the revolution, stirring up new waves of
the revolutionary tide. The question of transferring power to the new
class becomes the immediate question of the day.
Were
there disagreements in our Party then? Yes, there were. They were,
however, of a purely practical character, despite the assertions of
Trotsky, who is trying to discover a "Right" and a "Left"
wing in the Party. That is to say, they were such disagreements as
are inevitable where there is vigorous Party life and real Party
activity.
Trotsky
is wrong in asserting that the April demonstration in Petrograd gave
rise to disagreements in the Central Committee. The Central Committee
was absolutely united on this question and condemned the attempt of a
group of comrades to arrest the Provisional Government at a time when
the Bolsheviks were in a minority both in the Soviets and in the
army. Had Trotsky written the "history" of October not
according to Sukhanov, but according to authentic documents, he would
easily have convinced himself of the error of his assertion.
Trotsky
is absolutely wrong in asserting that the attempt, "on Lenin's
initiative," to arrange a demonstration on June 10 was described
as "adventurism" by the "Rightwing" members of
the Central Committee. Had Trotsky not written according to Sukhanov
he would surely have known that the June 10 demonstration was
postponed with the full agreement of Lenin, and that he urged the
necessity of postponing it in a big speech he delivered at the
well-known meeting of the Petrograd Committee (see minutes of the
Petrograd Committee [6]).
Trotsky
is absolutely wrong in speaking about "tragic"
disagreements in the Central Committee in connection with the July
armed demonstration. Trotsky is simply inventing in asserting that
some members of the leading group in the Central. Committee "could
not but regard the July episode as a harmful adventure."
Trotsky, who was then not yet a member of our Central Committee and
was merely our Soviet parliamentary, might, of course, not have known
that the Central Committee regarded the July demonstration only as a
means of sounding the enemy, that the Central Committee (and Lenin)
did not want to convert, did not even think of converting, the
demonstration into an uprising at a time when the Soviets in the
capitals still supported the defencists. It is quite possible that
some Bolsheviks did whimper over the July defeat. I know, for
example, that some of the Bolsheviks who were arrested at the time
were even prepared to desert our ranks. But to draw inferences from
this against certain alleged "Rights," alleged to be
members of the Central Committee, is a shameful distortion of
history.
Trotsky
is wrong in declaring that during the Kornilov days a section of the
Party leaders inclined towards the formation of a bloc with the
defencists, towards supporting the Provisional Government. He, of
course, is referring to those same alleged "Rights" who
keep him awake at night. Trotsky is wrong, for there exist documents,
such as the Central Organ of the Party of that time, which refute his
statements. Trotsky refers to Lenin's letter to the Central Committee
warning against supporting Kerensky; but Trotsky fails to understand
Lenin's letters, their significance, their purpose. In his letters,
Lenin sometimes deliberately ran ahead, pushing into the forefront
mistakes that might possibly be committed, and
criticising them in advance with the object of warning the Party and
of safeguarding it against mistakes. Sometimes he would even magnify
a "trifle" and "make a mountain out of a molehill"
for the same pedagogical purpose. The leader of the party, especially
if he is in hiding, cannot act otherwise, for he must see further
than his comrades-in-arms, he must sound the alarm over every
possible mistake, even over "trifles." But to infer from
such letters of Lenin's (and he wrote quite a number of such letters)
the existence of "tragic" disagreements and to trumpet them
forth means not to understand Lenin's letters, means not to know
Lenin. This, probably, explains why Trotsky sometimes is wide of the
mark. In short: there were no disagreements in the Central Committee
during the Kornilov revolt, absolutely none.
After
the July defeat, disagreement did indeed arise between the Central
Committee and Lenin on the question of the future of the Soviets. It
is known that Lenin, wishing to concentrate the Party's attention on
the task of preparing the uprising outside the Soviets, warned
against any infatuation with the latter, for he was of the opinion
that, having been defiled by the defencists, they had become useless.
The Central Committee and the Sixth Party Congress took a more
cautious line and decided that there were no grounds for excluding
the possibility that the Soviets would revive. The Kornilov revolt
showed that this decision was correct. This disagreement, however,
was of no great consequence for the Party. Later, Lenin admitted that
the line taken by the Sixth Congress had been correct. It is
interesting that Trotsky has not clutched at this disagreement and
has not magnified it to "monstrous" proportions.
A
united and solid party, the hub of the revolutionary mobilisation of
the masses -- such was the picture presented by our Party in that
period.
3) The
period of organisation of the assault (September-October). The
major facts of this period:
a) the
convocation of the Democratic Conference and the collapse of the idea
of a bloc with the Cadets;
b) the
Moscow and Petrograd Soviets go over to the side of the Bolsheviks;
c) the
Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region [7];
the Petrograd Soviet decides against the withdrawal of the troops;
d) the
decision of the Central Committee on the uprising and the formation
of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet;
e) the
Petrograd garrison decides to render the Petrograd Soviet armed
support; a network of commissars of the Revolutionary Military
Committee is organised;
f) the
Bolshevik armed forces go into action; the members of the Provisional
Government are arrested;
g) the
Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet takes power;
the Second Congress of Soviets sets up the Council of People's
Commissars.
The
characteristic feature of this period is the rapid growth of the
crisis, the utter consternation reigning among the ruling circles,
the isolation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and
the mass flight of the vacillating elements to the side of the
Bolsheviks. A peculiar feature of the tactics of the revolution in
this period must be noted, namely, that the revolution strove to take
every, or nearly every, step in its attack in the guise of defence.
Undoubtedly, the refusal to allow the troops to be withdrawn from
Petrograd was an important step in the revolution's attack;
nevertheless, this attack was carried out under the slogan of
protecting Petrograd from possible attack by the external enemy.
Undoubtedly, the formation of the Revolutionary Military Committee
was a still more important step in the attack upon the Provisional
Government; nevertheless, it was carried out under the slogan of
organising Soviet control over the actions of the Headquarters of the
Military Area. Undoubtedly, the open transition of the garrison to
the side of the Revolutionary Military Committee and the organisation
of a network of Soviet Commissars marked the beginning of the
uprising; nevertheless, the revolution took these steps under the
slogan of protecting the Petrograd Soviet from possible action by the
counterrevolution. The revolution, as it were, masked its actions in
attack under the cloak of defence in order the more easily to draw
the irresolute, vacillating elements into its orbit. This, no doubt,
explains the outwardly defensive character of the speeches, articles
and slogans of that period, the inner content of which, none the
less, was of a profoundly attacking nature.
Were
there disagreements in the Central Committee in that period? Yes,
there were, and fairly important ones at that. I have already spoken
about the disagreements over the uprising. They are fully reflected
in the minutes of the meetings of the Central Committee of October 10
and 16. I shall, therefore, not repeat what I have already said.
Three questions must now be dealt with: participation in the
Pre-parliament, the role of the Soviets in the uprising, and the date
of the uprising. This is all the more necessary because Trotsky, in
his zeal to push himself into a prominent place, has "inadvertently"
misrepresented the stand Lenin took on the last two questions.
Undoubtedly,
the disagreements on the question of the Pre-parliament were of a
serious nature. What was, so to speak, the aim of the Pre-parliament?
It was: to help the bourgeoisie to push the Soviets into the
background and to lay the foundations of bourgeois parliamentarism.
Whether the Pre-parliament could have accomplished this task in the
revolutionary situation that had arisen is another matter. Events
showed that this aim could not be realised, and the Pre-parliament
itself was a Kornilovite abortion. There can be no doubt, however,
that it was precisely this aim that the Mensheviks and
Socialist-Revolutionaries pursued in setting up the Pre-parliament.
What could the Bolsheviks' participation in the Pre-parliament mean
under those circumstances? Nothing but deceiving the proletarian
masses about the true nature of the Pre-parliament. This is the chief
explanation for the passion with which Lenin, in his letters,
scourged those who were in favour of taking part in the
Pre-parliament. There can be no doubt that it was a grave mistake to
have taken part in the Pre-parliament.
It
would be a mistake, however, to think, as Trotsky does, that those
who were in favour of taking part in the Pre-parliament went into it
for the purpose of constructive work, for the purpose of "directing
the working-class movement" "into the channel of
Social-Democracy." That is not at all the case. It is not true.
Had that been the case, the Party would not have been able to rectify
this mistake "in two ticks" by demonstratively walking out
of the Pre-parliament. Incidentally, the swift rectification of this
mistake was an expression of our Party's vitality and revolutionary
might.
And
now, permit me to correct a slight inaccuracy that has crept into the
report of Lentsner, the "editor" of Trotsky's works, about
the meeting of the Bolshevik group at which a decision on the
question of the Pre-parliament was taken. Lentsner says that there
were two reporters at this meeting, Kamenev and Trotsky. That is not
true. Actually, there were four reporters: two in favour of
boycotting the Pre-parliament (Trotsky and Stalin), and two in favour
of participation (Kamenev and Nogin).
Trotsky
is in a still worse position when dealing with the stand Lenin took
on the question of the form of the uprising. According to Trotsky, it
appears that Lenin's view was that the Party should take power in
October "independently of and behind the back of the Soviet."
Later on, criticising this nonsense, which he ascribes to Lenin,
Trotsky "cuts capers" and finally delivers the following
condescending utterance:
"That
would have been a mistake." Trotsky is here uttering a falsehood
about Lenin, he is misrepresenting Lenin's views on the role of the
Soviets in the uprising. A pile of documents can be cited, showing
that Lenin proposed that power be taken through the
Soviets, either the Petrograd or the Moscow Soviet, and not behind
the back of the Soviets. Why did Trotsky have to invent this
more than strange legend about Lenin?
Nor is
Trotsky in a better position when he "analyses" the stand
taken by the Central Committee and Lenin on the question of the date
of the uprising. Reporting the famous meeting of the Central
Committee of October 10, Trotsky asserts that at that meeting "a
resolution was carried to the effect that the uprising should take
place not later than October 15." From this it appears that the
Central Committee fixed October 15 as the date of the uprising and
then itself violated that decision by postponing the date of the
uprising to October 25. Is that true? No, it is not. During that
period the Central Committee passed only two resolutions on the
uprising -- one on October 10 and the other on October
16. Let us
read these resolutions.
The
Central Committee's resolution of October 10:
"The
Central Committee recognises that the international position of the
Russian revolution (the mutiny in the German navy, which is an
extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world
socialist revolution, and the threat of peace *** between
the imperialists with the object of strangling the revolution in
Russia) as well as the military situation (the indubitable decision
of the Russian bourgeoisie and Kerensky and Co. to surrender
Petrograd to the Germans), and the fact that the proletarian party
has gained a majority in the Soviets -- all this, taken in
conjunction with the peasant revolt and the swing of popular
confidence towards our Party (the elections in Moscow), and, finally,
the obvious preparations being made for a second Kornilov affair (the
withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the dispatch of Cossacks to
Petrograd, the surrounding of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.) -- all this
places an armed uprising on the order of the day.
"Considering,
therefore, that an armed uprising is inevitable, and that the time
for it is fully ripe, the Central Committee instructs all Party
organisations to be guided accordingly, and to discuss and decide all
practical questions (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region,
the withdrawal of troops from Petrograd, the actions of the people in
Moscow and Minsk, etc.) from this point of view." [8]
The
resolution adopted by the conference of the Central Committee with
responsible workers on October 16:
"This
meeting fully welcomes and wholly supports the Central Committee's
resolution, calls upon all organisations and all workers and soldiers
to make thorough and most intense preparations for an armed uprising
and for support of the centre set up by the Central Committee for
this purpose, and expresses complete confidence that the Central
Committee and the Soviet will in good time indicate the favourable
moment and the suitable means for launching the attack." [9]
You
see that Trotsky's memory betrayed him about the date of the uprising
and the Central Committee's resolution on the uprising.
Trotsky
is absolutely wrong in asserting that Lenin underrated Soviet
legality, that Lenin failed to appreciate the great importance of the
All-Russian Congress of Soviets taking power on October 25, and that
this was the reason why he insisted that power be taken before
October 25. That is not true. Lenin proposed that power be taken
before October 25 for two reasons. Firstly, because the
counter-revolutionaries might have surrendered Petrograd at any
moment, which would have drained the blood of the developing
uprising, and so every day was precious. Secondly, because the
mistake made by the Petrograd Soviet in openly fixing
and announcing the day of the uprising (October 25) could not be
rectified in any other way than by actually launching the
uprising before the legal date set for it. The fact
of the matter is that Lenin regarded insurrection as an art, and he
could not help knowing that the enemy, informed about the date of the
uprising (owing to the carelessness of the Petrograd Soviet) would
certainly try to prepare for that day. Consequently, it was necessary
to forestall the enemy, i.e., without fail to launch the
uprising before the legal date. This is the chief
explanation for the passion with which Lenin in his letters scourged
those who made a fetish of the date -- October 25. Events showed that
Lenin was absolutely right. It is well known that the uprising was
launched prior to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It is well
known that power was actually taken before the opening of the
All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and it was taken not by the Congress
of Soviets, but by the Petrograd Soviet, by the Revolutionary
Military Committee. The Congress of Soviets merely took
over power from the Petrograd Soviet. That is why Trotsky's
lengthy arguments about the importance of Soviet legality are quite
beside the point.
A
virile and mighty party standing at the head of the revolutionary
masses who were storming and overthrowing bourgeois rule -- such was
the state of our Party in that period.
That
is how matters stand with the legends about the preparation for
October.
III.
TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM?
We
have dealt above with the legends directed against the Party and
those about Lenin spread by Trotsky and his supporters in connection
with October and the preparation for it. We have exposed and refuted
these legends. But the question arises: For what purpose did Trotsky
need all these legends about October and the preparation for October,
about Lenin and the Party of Lenin? What is the purpose of Trotsky's
new literary pronouncements against the Party? What is the sense, the
purpose, the aim of these pronouncements now, when the Party does not
want a discussion, when the Party is busy with a host of urgent
tasks, when the Party needs united efforts to restore our economy and
not a new struggle around old questions? For what purpose does
Trotsky need to drag the Party back, to new discussions?
Trotsky
asserts that all this is needed for the purpose of "studying"
October. But is it not possible to study October without giving
another kick at the Party and its leader Lenin? What sort of a
"history" of October is it that begins and ends with
attempts to discredit the chief leader of the October uprising, to
discredit the Party, which organised and carried through the
uprising? No, it is not a matter here of studying October. That
is not the way to study October. That is not
the way to write the history of October. Obviously, there is a
different "design" here, and everything goes to show that
this "design" is that Trotsky by his literary
pronouncements is making another (yet another!) attempt to create the
conditions for substituting Trotskyism for Leninism. Trotsky needs
"desperately" to discredit the Party, and its cadres who
carried through the uprising, in order, after discrediting the Party,
to proceed to discredit Leninism. And it is necessary for him to
discredit Leninism in order to drag in Trotskyism as the "sole"
"proletarian" (don't laugh!) ideology. All this, of course
(oh, of course!) under the flag of Leninism, so that the dragging
operation may be performed "as painlessly as possible. "
That
is the essence of Trotsky's latest literary pronouncements.
That
is why those literary pronouncements of Trotsky's sharply raise the
question of Trotskyism.
And
so, what is Trotskyism?
Trotskyism
possesses three specific features which bring it into irreconcilable
contradiction with Leninism.
What
are these features?
Firstly. Trotskyism
is the theory of "permanent" (uninterrupted) revolution.
But what is permanent revolution in its Trotskyist interpretation? It
is revolution that fails to take the poor peasantry into account as a
revolutionary force. Trotsky's "permanent" revolution is,
as Lenin said, "skipping" the peasant movement, "playing
at the seizure of power." Why is it dangerous? Because such a
revolution, if an attempt had been made to bring it about, would
inevitably have ended in failure, for it would have divorced from the
Russian proletariat its ally, the poor peasantry. This explains the
struggle that Leninism has been waging against Trotskyism ever since
1905.
How
does Trotsky appraise Leninism from the standpoint of this struggle?
He regards it as a theory that possesses "anti-revolutionary
features." What is this indignant opinion about Leninism based
on? On the fact that, at the proper time, Leninism advocated and
upheld the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.
But
Trotsky does not confine himself to this indignant opinion. He goes
further and asserts: "The entire edifice of Leninism at the
present time is built on lies and falsification and bears within
itself the poisonous elements of its own decay" (see Trotsky's
letter to Chkheidze, 1913). As you see, we have before us two
opposite lines.
Secondly. Trotskyism
is distrust of the Bolshevik Party principle, of the monolithic
character of the Party, of its hostility towards opportunist
elements. In the sphere of organisation, Trotskyism is the theory
that revolutionaries and opportunists can co-exist and form groups
and coteries within a single party. You are, no doubt, familiar with
the history of Trotsky's August bloc, in which the Martovites and
Otzovists, the Liquidators and Trotskyites, happily co-operated,
pretending that they were a "real" party. It is well known
that this patchwork "party" pursued the aim of destroying
the Bolshevik Party. What was the nature of "our disagreements"
at that time? It was that Leninism regarded the destruction of the
August bloc as a guarantee of the development of the proletarian
party, whereas Trotskyism regarded that bloc as the basis for
building a "real" party.
Again,
as you see, we have two opposite lines.
Thirdly. Trotskyism
is distrust of the leaders of Bolshevism, an attempt to discredit, to
defame them. I do not know of a single trend in the Party that could
compare with Trotskyism in the matter of discrediting the leaders of
Leninism or the central institutions of the Party. For example, what
should be said of Trotsky's "polite" opinion of Lenin, whom
he described as "a professional exploiter of every kind of
backwardness in the Russian working-class movement"? (ibid.)
And this is far from being the most "polite" of the
"polite" opinions Trotsky has expressed.
How
could it happen that Trotsky, who carried such a nasty stock-in-trade
on his back, found himself, after all, in the ranks of the Bolsheviks
during the October movement? It happened because at that time Trotsky
abandoned (actually did abandon) that stock-in-trade; he hid it in
the cupboard. Had he not performed that "operation," real
co-operation with him would have been impossible. The theory of the
August bloc, i.e., the theory of unity with the Mensheviks, had
already been shattered and thrown overboard by the revolution, for
how could there be any talk about unity when an armed struggle was
raging between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks? Trotsky had no
alternative but to admit that this theory was useless.
The
same misadventure "happened" to the theory of permanent
revolution, for not a single Bolshevik contemplated the immediate
seizure of power on the morrow of the February Revolution, and
Trotsky could not help knowing that the Bolsheviks would not allow
him, in the words of Lenin, "to play at the seizure of power."
Trotsky had no alternative but recognise the Bolsheviks' policy of
fighting for influence in the Soviets, of fighting to win over the
peasantry. As regards the third specific feature of Trotskyism
(distrust of the Bolshevik leaders), it naturally had to retire into
the background owing to the obvious failure of the first two
features.
Under
those circumstances, could Trotsky do anything else but hide his
stock-in-trade in the cupboard and follow the Bolsheviks, considering
that he had no group of his own of any significance, and that he came
to the Bolsheviks as a political individual, without an army? Of
course, he could not!
What
is the lesson to be learnt from this? Only one: that prolonged
collaboration between the Leninists and Trotsky is possible only if
the latter completely abandons his old stock-in-trade, only if he
completely accepts Leninism. Trotsky writes about the lessons of
October, but he forgets that, in addition to all the other lessons,
there is one more lesson of October, the one I have just mentioned,
which is of prime importance for Trotskyism. Trotskyism ought to
learn that lesson of October too.
It is
evident, however, that Trotskyism has not learnt that lesson. The
fact of the matter is that the old stock-in-trade of Trotskyism that
was hidden in the cupboard in the period of the October movement is
now being dragged into the light again in the hope that a market will
be found for it, seeing that the market in our country is expanding.
Undoubtedly, Trotsky's new literary pronouncements are an attempt to
revert to Trotskyism, to "overcome" Leninism, to drag in,
implant, all the specific features of Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism
is not a mere repetition of the old Trotskyism; its feathers have
been plucked and it is rather bedraggled; it is incomparably milder
in spirit and more moderate in form than the old Trotskyism; but, in
essence, it undoubtedly retains all the specific features of the old
Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism does not dare to come out as a
militant force against Leninism; it prefers to operate under the
common flag of Leninism, under the slogan of interpreting, improving
Leninism. That is because it is weak. It cannot be regarded as an
accident that the appearance of the new Trotskyism coincided with
Lenin's departure. In Lenin's lifetime it would not have dared to
take this risky step.
What
are the characteristic features of the new Trotskyism?
1) On
the question of "permanent" revolution. The
new Trotskyism does not deem it necessary openly to uphold the theory
of "permanent" revolution. It "simply" asserts
that the October Revolution fully confirmed the idea of "permanent"
revolution. From this it draws the following conclusion: the
important and acceptable part of Leninism is the part that came after
the war, in the period of the October Revolution; on the other hand,
the part of Leninism that existed before the war, before the October
Revolution, is wrong and unacceptable. Hence, the Trotskyites' theory
of the division of Leninism into two parts: pre-war Leninism, the
"old," "useless" Leninism with its idea of the
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, and the new, post-war,
October Leninism, which they count on adapting to the requirements of
Trotskyism. Trotskyism needs this theory of the division of Leninism
as a first, more or less "acceptable" step that is
necessary to facilitate further steps in its struggle against
Leninism.
But
Leninism is not an eclectic theory stuck together out of diverse
elements and capable of being cut into parts. Leninism is an integral
theory, which arose in 1903, has passed the test of three
revolutions, and is now being carried forward as the battle-flag of
the world proletariat.
"Bolshevism,"
Lenin said, "as a trend of political thought and as a political
party, has existed since 1903. Only the history of Bolshevism during
the whole period of its existence can satisfactorily
explain why it was able to build up and to maintain under most
difficult conditions the iron discipline needed for the victory of
the proletariat" (see Vol. XXV, p. 174).
Bolshevism
and Leninism are one. They are two names for one and the same thing.
Hence, the theory of the division of Leninism into two parts is a
theory intended to destroy Leninism, to substitute Trotskyism for
Leninism.
Needless
to say, the Party cannot reconcile itself to this grotesque theory.
2) On
the question of the Party principle. The old Trotskyism
tried to undermine the Bolshevik Party principle by means of the
theory (and practice) of unity with the Mensheviks. But that theory
has suffered such disgrace that nobody now even wants to mention it.
To undermine the Party principle, present-day Trotskyism has invented
the new, less odious and almost "democratic" theory of
contrasting the old cadres to the younger Party element. According to
Trotskyism, our Party has not a single and integral history.
Trotskyism divides the history of our Party into two parts of unequal
importance: pre-October and post-October. The pre-October part of the
history of our Party is, properly speaking, not history, but
"pre-history," the unimportant or, at all events, not very
important preparatory period of our Party. The post-October part of
the history of our Party, however, is real, genuine history. In the
former, there are the "old," "pre-historic,"
unimportant cadres of our Party. In the latter there is the new,
real, "historic" Party. It scarcely needs proof that this
singular scheme of the history of the Party is a scheme to disrupt
the unity between the old and the new cadres of our Party, a scheme
to destroy the Bolshevik Party principle.
Needless
to say, the Party cannot reconcile itself to this grotesque scheme.
3) On
the question of the leaders of Bolshevism. The old
Trotskyism tried to discredit Lenin more or less openly, without
fearing the consequences. The new Trotskyism is more cautious. It
tries to achieve the purpose of the old Trotskyism by pretending to
praise, to exalt Lenin. I think it is worth while quoting a few
examples.
The
Party knows that Lenin was a relentless revolutionary; but it knows
also that he was cautious, that he disliked reckless people and
often, with a firm hand, restrained those who were infatuated with
terrorism, including Trotsky himself. Trotsky touches on this subject
in his book On Lenin, but from his portrayal of Lenin one
might think that all Lenin did was "at every opportunity to din
into people's minds the idea that terrorism was inevitable." The
impression is created that Lenin was the most bloodthirsty of all the
bloodthirsty Bolsheviks.
For
what purpose did Trotsky need this uncalled for and totally
unjustified exaggeration?
The
Party knows that Lenin was an exemplary Party man, who did not like
to settle questions alone, without the leading collective body, on
the spur of the moment, without careful investigation and
verification. Trotsky touches upon this aspect, too, in his book. But
the portrait he paints is not that of Lenin, but of a sort of Chinese
mandarin, who settles important questions in the quiet of his study,
by intuition.
Do you
want to know how our Party settled the question of dispersing the
Constituent Assembly? Listen to Trotsky:
"'Of
course, the Constituent Assembly will have to be dispersed,' said
Lenin, 'but what about the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries?'
"But
our apprehensions were greatly allayed by old Natanson. He came in to
'take counsel' with us, and after the first few words he said:
"'We
shall probably have to disperse the Constituent Assembly by force.'
"'Bravo!'
exclaimed Lenin. 'What is true is true! But will your people agree to
it?'
"'Some
of our people are wavering, but I think that in the end they will
agree,' answered Natanson."
That
is how history is written.
Do you
want to know how the Party settled the question about the Supreme
Military Council? Listen to Trotsky:
"'Unless
we have serious and experienced military experts we shall never
extricate ourselves from this chaos,' I said to Vladimir Ilyich after
every visit to the Staff.
"'That
is evidently true, but they might betray us....'
"'Let
us attach a commissar to each of them.'
"'Two
would be better," exclaimed Lenin, 'and strong-handed ones.
There surely must be strong-handed Communists in our ranks.'
"That
is how the structure of the Supreme Military Council arose."
That
is how Trotsky writes history.
Why
did Trotsky need these "Arabian Nights" stories derogatory
to Lenin? Was it to exalt V. I. Lenin, the leader of the Party? It
doesn't look like it.
The
Party knows that Lenin was the greatest Marxist of our times, a
profound theoretician and a most experienced revolutionary, to whom
any trace of Blanquism was alien. Trotsky touches upon this aspect,
too, in his book. But the portrait he paints is not that of the giant
Lenin, but of a dwarf-like Blanquist who, in the October days,
advises the Party "to take power by its own hand, independently
of and behind the back of the Soviet." I have already said,
however, that there is not a scrap of truth in this description.
Why
did Trotsky need this flagrant ... inaccuracy? Is this not an attempt
to discredit Lenin "just a little"?
Such
are the characteristic features of the new Trotskyism.
What
is the danger of this new Trotskyism? It is that Trotskyism, owing to
its entire inner content, stands every chance of becoming the centre
and rallying point of the non-proletarian elements who are striving
to weaken, to disintegrate the proletarian dictatorship.
You
will ask: what is to be done now? What are the Party's immediate
tasks in connection with Trotsky's new literary pronouncements?
Trotskyism
is taking action now in order to discredit Bolshevism and to
undermine its foundations. It is the duty of the Party to
bury Trotskyism as an ideological trend.
There
is talk about repressive measures against the opposition and about
the possibility of a split. That is nonsense, comrades. Our Party is
strong and mighty. It will not allow any splits. As regards
repressive measures, I am emphatically opposed to them. What we need
now is not repressive measures, but an extensive ideological struggle
against renascent Trotskyism.
We did
not want and did not strive for this literary discussion. Trotskyism
is forcing it upon us by its anti-Leninist pronouncements. Well, we
are ready, comrades.
NOTES By
J. V. Stalin.
[*] See Lenin's Works, Vol. XX, p. 104. See also the reports made at the Petrograd City Conference and at the All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (middle and end of April, 1917).
[**] Among these legends must be included also the very widespread story that Trotsky was the "sole" or "chief organiser" of the victories on the fronts of the civil war. I must declare, comrades, in the interest of truth, that this version is quite out of accord with the facts. I am far from denying that Trotsky played an important role in the civil war. But I must emphatically declare that the high honour of being the organiser of our victories belongs not to individuals, but to the great collective body of advanced workers in our country, the Russian Communist Party. Perhaps it will not be out of place to quote a few examples. You know that Kolchak and Denikin were regarded as the principal enemies of the Soviet Republic. You know that our country breathed freely only after those enemies were defeated. Well, history shows that both those enemies, i.e., Kolchak and Denikin, were routed by our troops in spite of Trotsky's plans.
Judge for yourselves.
1) Kolchak. This is in the summer of 1919. Our troops are advancing against Kolchak and are operating near Ufa. A meeting of the Central Committee is held. Trotsky proposes that the advance be halted along the line of the River Belaya (near Ufa), leaving the Urals in the hands of Kolchak, and that part of the troops be withdrawn from the Eastern Front and transferred to the Southern Front. A heated debate takes place. The Central Committee disagrees with Trotsky, being of the opinion that the Urals, with its factories and railway network, must not be left in the hands of Kolchak, for the latter could easily recuperate there organise a strong force and reach the Volga again; Kolchak must first be driven beyond the Ural range into the Siberian steppes, and only after that has been done should forces be transferred to the South The Central Committee rejects Trotsky's plan. Trotsky hands in his resignation. The Central Committee refuses to accept it. Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis, who supported Trotsky's plan, resigns. His place is taken by a new Commander-in-Chief, Kamenev. From that moment Trotsky ceases to take a direct part in the affairs of the Eastern Front.
2) Denikin. This is in the autumn of 1919. The offensive against Denikin is not proceeding successfully. The "steel ring" around Mamontov (Mamontov's raid) is obviously collapsing. Denikin captures Kursk. Denikin is approaching Orel. Trotsky is summoned from the Southern Front to attend a meeting of the Central Committee. The Central Committee regards the situation as alarming and decides to send new military leaders to the Southern Front and to withdraw Trotsky. The new military leaders demand "no intervention" by Trotsky in the affairs of the Southern Front. Trotsky ceases to take a direct part in the affairs of the Southern Front.. Operations on the Southern Front, right up to the capture of Rostov-on-Don and Odessa by our troops, proceed without Trotsky.
Let anybody try to refute these facts.
[***] Obviously, this should be "a separate peace." -- J. St.
* * *
1] The
"Contact Committee," consisting of Chkheidze, Steklov,
Sukhanov, Filippovsky and Skobelev (and later Chernov and Tsereteli),
was set up by the Menshevik and SocialistRevolutionary Executive
Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
on March 7, 1917, for the purpose of establishing contact with the
Provisional Government, of "influencing" it and
"controlling" its activities. Actually, the "Contact
Committee" helped to carry out the bourgeois policy of the
Provisional Government and restrained the masses of the workers from
waging an active revolutionary struggle to transfer all power to the
Soviets. The "Contact Committee" existed until May 1917,
when representatives of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries
entered the provisional Government.
[2] See
V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ea., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7.
[3] The
Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) took place from April
27 to May 5 (April 14-22), 1917, with 57 delegates present. V. I.
Lenin and J. V. Stalin took part in the proceedings. V. I. Lenin
delivered a report on the current situation based on his April
Theses. J. V. Stalin was elected to the commission for drafting the
resolution on V. I. Lenin's report.
[4] Concerning
the Seventh AllRussian April Conference of the Bolshevik Party see
the History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow
1952, pp. 291-96.
[5] See
V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ea., Vol. 23, pp. 289-333.
[6] See
"Speech by V. I. Lenin at the Meeting of the Petrograd Committee
of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), June 24 (11), 1917, Concerning the Cancelling
of the Demonstration" (Works, 4th Russ. ea., Vol.
25, pp. 62-63).
[7] The
Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the
Northern Region took place in Petrograd on October 24-26 (11-13),
1917, under the direction of the Bolsheviks. Representatives were
present from Petrograd, Moscow, Kronstadt, Novgorod, Reval,
Helsingfors, Vyborg and other cities. In all there were 94 delegates,
of whom 51 were Bolsheviks. The congress adopted a resolution on the
need for immediate transference of all power to the Soviets, central
and local. It called upon the peasants to support the struggle for
the transference of power to the Soviets and urged the Soviets
themselves to commence active operations and to set up Revolutionary
Military Committees for organising the military defence of the
revolution. The congress set up a Northern Regional Committee and
instructed it to prepare for the convocation of the Second
All-Russian Congress of Soviets and to co-ordinate the activities of
all the Regional Soviets.
[9] See
V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ea.. Vol. 26.